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Chapter 4
The Engine: Safeguarding 
Itself before Safeguarding 
Others
To be a blacksmith, you must be tough yourself.
—Old Chinese Proverb
Alexander Tereshkin and Rafal Wojtczuk, from the Invisible Things Labs of Poland, 
introduced the concept of “Ring -3 rootkit” at the 2009 Black Hat conference in Las Vegas.1  
They presented an attack against host memory through a rootkit installed on Intel’s 
management engine. Audiences, many hearing about the management engine for the first 
time, were impressed by the sophisticated attack. People asked: If the embedded system 
itself is buggy, how could users trust it to safeguard users’ valuable assets?
The security and management engine is a small computer, with its own processor,i  
memory, and nonvolatile storage. It has the capability of performing certain tasks that do 
not require high bandwidth or data throughput. It acts as a helpful assistant to the main 
operating system, to carry security sensitive operations that are too risky to be executed 
on the more exposed main processing environment. In addition to security, the engine 
also enables platform manageability features and capabilities, such as AMT (Active 
Management Technology; see Chapter 2).
Due to the nature of the engine, in order to perform its assigned tasks, the engine 
has to communicate with the host operating system and the CPU, and access the host 
memory. For certain cases, the engine has even more privileges than ring 0 software.
As such, the engine itself becomes a possible security backdoor and an interesting 
target of hackers. Sophisticated attacks may be able to exploit the engine’s vulnerabilities, 
if they exist, and leverage its wide range of privileges to attack against the host system.
iIn this chapter, processor refers to the engine’s processing unit.  The system’s main processor is 
referred to as a CPU (central processing unit).
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Therefore, making it strong and robust against attacks is the fundamental goal when 
building the engine. But how is the goal achieved? This chapter reveals the techniques 
deployed to safeguard the security and management engine from attacks. Note that 
descriptions of techniques in this chapter are based on the latest engine release for 2014. 
Security is a progressive effort for the engine. Some of the latest safeguarding features 
may not be available on older versions of the engine.
The security and management engine is equipped with powerful privileges, which 
are necessary for the engine to perform defined security functionalities. The embedded 
engine is not restricted by security measures enforced by the user’s operating system, 
Windows, Linux, or Android. The engine is able to access virtually the entire host 
memory space with the exception of certain system-reserved regions. The engine can 
also communicate with the CPU of the platform and instruct the CPU to perform specific 
operations. For power management, the engine has the capability to instantly power 
down the entire platform.
However, the security and management engine is not a black box to the host.  The 
engine reports its status at runtime to the host via a register that is read only by ring 0 
drivers of the host operating system.
Access to Host Memory
Recall that the HECI (host-embedded communication interface) introduced in Chapter 
3 is a communication channel between the engine and the host. However, it suffers from 
narrow bandwidth—only a small amount of data can be transmitted per transaction. 
Due to such restrictions, HECI is commonly used for delivering control and management 
commands, but not bulk data.
Many applications on the engine have the need to exchange large amounts of data 
between the engine and its software counterparts running on the host operating system. 
For example, for content protection usage, the engine must first copy encrypted video 
and audio frames from the host to the embedded memory, and then perform decryption. 
A movie can have hundreds of thousands of frames, and they must be processed at high 
speed to ensure smoothness of the playback. Another example: the wireless LAN (WLAN) 
embedded application must copy network traffic data to the host memory and send it 
through the WLAN adapter.
To support such uses, the backbone of the engine contains dedicated DMA (direct 
memory access) hardware that copies data between the host memory and the embedded 
memory. The engine’s firmware kernel is the only entity that manages DMA operations 
between the host and the engine through the DMA devices. Embedded applications call 
a kernel API (Application Programming Interface) to request DMA to and from the host 
memory. Host memory is referenced by its physical address.
Obviously, reading and writing arbitrary host memory is a superior privilege that, 
if abused, can result in serious security consequences. The attack against the engine 
presented by Alexander Tereshkin and Rafal Wojtczuk exploited a buffer overflow bug in 
the BIOS2 and a critical design flaw in the engine, and managed to turn the engine into a 
rootkit that can write to arbitrary host memory.
To respond to the attack, in addition to fixing the BIOS’ buffer overflow bug 
and correcting the engine’s design flaw, several hardening measures have also been 
implemented on the engine.
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•	 Small DMA driver: Have a small “privileged” component, named 
“DMA driver,” in the firmware kernel manage the DMA devices. 
The kernel is logically isolated from other firmware modules. The 
kernel is subject to more stringent code review and validation to 
ensure it is free of bugs.
•	 Restrictive access control: The DMA access is not granted to 
all firmware applications.  An application must show justified 
reasons to invoke the DMA engine. The list of applications that 
are allowed DMA access is predefined and hardcoded in the DMA 
driver. At runtime, the DMA driver identifies the caller and makes 
sure it is on the white list, before fulfilling the request.
•	 Restrictive memory range control: For a firmware application that 
is allowed DMA access, the logic for determining host memory 
ranges to be accessed must be a separate component that is 
logically isolated from the rest of the application. Just like the 
DMA driver, such components are subject to more stringent code 
review and testing to ensure they are free of bugs.
•	 Integrity protection on “borrowed” memory: The firmware reserves 
a portion of DRAM (dynamic random-access memory) and uses 
it as secondary memory at runtime.  The “borrowed” memory is 
protected for integrity and confidentiality against attacks from  
the host.
•	 Blocked access to certain system memory: The engine’s DMA 
devices are not allowed to read or write certain system 
memory; for example, the memory regions reserved for VT-d2 
(Virtualization Technology for Directed I/O) and SMM3 (System 
Management Mode).
Communication with the CPU
Some firmware applications running on the security and management engine coordinate 
with the CPU to perform certain functionalities that involve both the engine and the CPU.
On SoC (Systems-on-Chip) systems, the data between the embedded engine and 
the CPU is transmitted over the Intel on-chip system fabric (IOSF). The engine’s firmware 
was designed based on the presumption that IOSF is insecure; that is, third parties may 
eavesdrop the data travelled on IOSF. Therefore, no secrets or keys may be sent in the 
clear between the engine and the CPU. Secrets are always encrypted before transmission.
On big-core systems, the data between the engine and the CPU is transmitted over 
the DMI (Direct Media Interface) link.  Similar to the case of IOSF, the DMI link is not 
trusted.
Like the DMA driver, there is a privileged “IOSF driver” and “DMI driver” in the 
engine’s kernel that centrally manages access to the CPU. Applications that are allowed to 
access to the CPU are predefined, and such privilege is granted on a “need to have” basis.
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Triggering Power Flow
The engine’s power management unit is able to trigger power state transitions for the 
engine and the host. Some applications running on the engine perform power transitions 
at defined scenarios. For example, anti-theftii must unconditionally shut down the 
platform without notifying the host or asking for the user’s consent when it finds the 
system in a stolen state.
Another usage model of power transition is when an attack is detected. The engine 
may instantly shut down the platform to terminate the attack and prevent secrets leakage.
Security Requirements
Setting requirements is the first step for the product architecture and design. For an 
embedded system such as the security and management engine, security requirements 
are as important as, or even more important than, functional requirements.
At a high level, the engine is made up of a kernel and multiple applications running 
on top of the kernel. This section discusses general security requirements that must 
be followed by the kernel and all applications. In addition to these requirements, 
individual modules should define their own security requirements. For example, a basic 
requirement for the content protection application is never to expose its device private 
key or clear premium content to the host.





In addition, there is a basic guideline for realizing security: Never rely on security 
through obscurity.
When designing security hardening features for the engine, it is always assumed 
that all firmware source code and internal architecture documentation may be obtained 
by attackers. The engine’s security design principle is to harden the product by applying 
proven cryptography and security primitives, rather than rely on hiding secrets in the 
code or documents.
Confidentiality
The security and management engine treats code segments and noncode segments 
differently when applying confidentiality protections. The code segment, also known as 
a text segment, is read-only and contains executable instructions. Noncode segments 
include data, heap, bss, stack, and so on. In this chapter, noncode segments are referred 
to as data segments for the sake of simplicity.
iiAnti-theft is an Intel technology for protecting data on mobile devices from being stolen. Intel has 
announced the termination of the service by the end of January 2015.
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The engine processes many different secrets of high value in its data segment. 
Examples include:
EPID (enhanced private identification) private key (see Chapter 5 •	
for details)
TPM (trusted platform module) endorsement key (see Chapter 7 •	
for details)
Secret data must be kept private, at runtime and at rest. The engine has dedicated 
internal memory (static random-access memory or SRAM) as level-2 cache for storing 
runtime data and processor instructions. The memory is not accessible from the outside 
world.
As the internal SRAM is expensive and limited, the engine also “borrows” the 
system DRAM as level-3 cache and uses it to temporarily store memory pages that are 
not recently accessed by the processor. The DRAM is considered insecure. All data pages 
swapped to the DRAM, whether they contain secrets or not, are encrypted with a 128-bit 
AES-CBC key.
To provide confidentiality protection for secrets at rest, during manufacturing, each 
instance of the embedded engine is installed with unique security fuses. The kernel 
derives a 128-bit AES key at every boot. The key is used to encrypt nonvolatile data before 
the data is stored on the SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash.
For applications that interact with the outside world (software programs running 
on the host, CPU, network, and so on), the communication channels are treated as 
open channels that malware can read and alter. Therefore, secrets must be protected by 
appropriate encryption algorithms or protocols, such as TLS6 (Transport Layer Security). 
Individual applications are responsible for the protection.
What about the code segment? Due to major performance costs of encrypting code, 
the security and management engine does not protect confidentiality of its compiled 
binary image. By design, the firmware binary should not contain secrets, and hence it is 
not encrypted or obfuscated in any form. Note that lossless compression may be applied 
to the code.
The firmware binary, in its compression form, is stored on SPI flash in cleartext. At 
runtime, the code segment is not encrypted when it is paged out to DRAM.
Admittedly, advanced hackers have successfully reverse-engineered and 
disassembled the engine’s firmware binary. However, knowledge of source code is not 
deemed a harmful threat, because no secrets or keys are ever hardcoded in the code, and 
the architecture and robustness of the engine does not rely on security through obscurity.
Integrity
The integrity protection makes sure that the target being protected has not been altered 
unexpectedly due to corruptions or attacks. Several algorithms are common choices for 
integrity assurance.
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•	 Digital signature, such as RSA and ECDSA: The owner of the 
raw data signs the data with her private key. The signature 
is then appended to the raw data. Any entity that knows the 
corresponding public key can verify the owner’s signature on the 
data. Because operations of digital signature are relatively slow, it 
is usually used for signing small amounts of data.
•	 Keyed hash: The owner of the raw data calculates a digest with a 
secret key. The digest is then appended to the data. Any entity that 
knows the secret key can verify the digest of the data.
•	 Plain hash: The owner of the raw data calculates a digest without 
a key. The digest is then appended to the data. Any entity can 
verify the digest of the data.
•	 CRC (cyclic redundancy check): CRC is not a cryptography 
algorithm but an error-detecting scheme, which is intended 
to detect accidental changes to data, rather than intentional 
attacks. A short (for example, 32 bits) parity check value is 
calculated using the CRC algorithm and attached to the raw data. 
On retrieval, the same calculation is repeated and the result is 
compared with the appended parity.
The kernel of the security and management engine provides interfaces for all 
aforementioned algorithms for applications, to protect their data’s integrity.
For an embedded system, integrity of the code segment is also a critical 
consideration. It is a requirement that the security and management engine’s processor 
and hardware executes only unmodified instructions that were signed by Intel or a 
designated entity. The design flaw exploited by Alexander Tereshkin and Rafal Wojtczuk 
was lacking integrity protection for the code segment, allowing injection and execution of 
malicious code that is not endorsed by Intel.
More details about the approach for protecting the integrity of the engine’s code 
segment are discussed later in this chapter.
Availability
Availability refers to the accessibility of the services provided by the embedded engine 
and the platform. Note that the availability requirement of the engine applies to the entire 
system, including the host. In other words, the engine must not cause the host to crash or 
become unavailable.
The exact requirement of availability varies depending on the attacker’s privilege.
If the attacker has physical access to the platform, then availability •	
is not a consideration. With physical access, one can destroy the 
system with a hammer.
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Note ■  the anti-theft application is an exception—it must be available to function even if 
the attacker has physical access to the platform. 
If the attacker has local access—that is, he can install malware on •	
the host operating system—then he shall not be able to disable, 
reset, or turn off the embedded engine.
If the attacker has network access, then similarly to local access, •	
he shall not be able to disable, reset, or turn off the embedded 
engine.
The general guideline regarding availability is that malware or virus on the host 
system or network shall not be able to mount denial of service (DoS) attacks against the 
engine. This requirement implies that the engine’s external (such as HECI and network) 
interfaces must be robust. They must reject malformed input gracefully and handle large 
amount of requests properly. Under any circumstances, an external input should not 
cause the engine to crash. Note that the engine supports multiple usages and features that 
are running over the kernel. Security protections of one feature must be protected from 
compromise by users of another service. For example, an AMT administrator shall not be 
able to influence EPID operations.
The anti-theft application has its unique functionality, and hence, special 
requirement about availability. The definition of availability for anti-theft is opposite to 
what availability normally means. By design, it must enforce unconditional shutdown of 
the platform when the system is detected to be in the stolen state.
In the stolen state, the thief (attacker) possesses the platform and has physical 
access. In this case, anti-theft must continue to be available and function normally by 
enforcing the platform shutdown per defined policies. The attacker may physically 
destroy the platform and render it unusable, which does not violate the availability 
requirement of anti-theft.
Another important requirement is the availability of the host. Because the embedded 
engine is able to trigger instant shutdown of the system, malware may exploit firmware 
vulnerability to shut down the computer locally or remotely, realizing an annoying DoS 
attack. This is an ungraceful shutdown, and all unsaved user data will be lost. The attack 
may launch repeatedly right after reboot and essentially turn the computer into a brick.
The Sasser worm of 2004 is a notable example of how costly DoS attacks can be. The 
author of the worm reverse-engineered a patch released by Microsoft that fixed a buffer 
overflow bug in Windows 2000 and XP, and discovered the bug.  The worm exploited 
the vulnerability on computers that had not installed the patch. The worm allowed 
remote execution of code on the host without the knowledge of the user. In the United 
States alone, the shutdown of computers due to the Sasser worm resulted in a damage of 
approximately 15 billion US dollars.7
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Threat Analysis and Mitigation
The threat analysis involves applying the general security requirements—confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability—to the architecture and design of the security and 
management engine.
This section reviews most critical threats that are considered during the 
development of the engine, and the corresponding security measures and mitigation 
plans implemented by the engine.
Load Integrity
There are two physical locations at which the firmware image of the security and 
management engine are stored:
The boot loader is stored in a ROM (read-only memory). Thanks •	
to the nature of ROM, this small portion of code is considered 
intact. Mitigation against altering or injecting to the code in ROM 
is out of scope. The ROM is the root of trust of the embedded 
engine. Note that physical tampering and fault injection attacks 
are out of scope.
The rest of the firmware image is stored in SPI flash together with •	
BIOS and other firmware ingredients of the system. Different 
products support different sets of features and applications. 
Depending on the product, the size of the engine’s firmware 
ranges from 1.5MB to 5MB.
Although the flash part is supposed to be locked down at manufacturing, in security 
modeling, it is assumed that the chip can be replaced and the lockdown mechanism can 
be circumvented by attackers. Therefore, when the boot loader in ROM is loading the 
image from the flash, it must be confident that the loaded code has not been modified.
The firmware image on flash is signed by Intel. The signing algorithm is 2048-bit RSA 
with an SHA-256 and a PKCS#1 padding scheme. The signature is not on the entire binary 
image of a few megabytes, but on a small manifest for the binary.
The manifest contains information for all firmware modules. A module can be the 
kernel or an application such as anti-theft, content protection, and so on. Among all  
the information of a module described in the manifest, the most critical, security-wise, is 
the SHA-256 digest of the module. The SHA-256 digests of all modules are digitally signed.
Here is the flow of building a firmware image:
 1. Compile all modules.
 2. Calculate SHA-256 digests for all compiled modules, 
respectively.
 3. Fill in the manifest header. The header includes fields such as:
a. Firmware version number
b. Firmware security version number
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c. Size of the header
d. Number of modules
 4. Apply compression algorithms to modules, if applicable. 
There are three options to choose from for a given module:
a. No compression
b. Huffman compression8
c. LZMA9 (Lempel-Ziv–Markov chain) compression
Decompression is performed by the boot loader in ROM during 
loading. The engine has dedicated hardware logic to support 
Huffman, so the Huffman decompression is relatively fast. For 
an LZMA-compressed module, the decompression is carried 
out by firmware logic located in ROM. As it is a firmware 
implementation, the decompression is slower than that of the 
Huffman decompression. However, the adaptive LZMA enjoys a 
higher compression ratio than Huffman, which uses a hardcoded 
static dictionary. There is a tradeoff between binary image size 
and decompression performance at load time. In general, kernel 
components that impact load time choose no compression or 
Huffman compression for performance reasons, and applications 
normally use LZMA. Note that the data after decompression is 
still not trusted, so an attack on corrupting the decompression 
results is equivalent to flash corruption.








g. Entry point address
 6. Fill in the RSA public key (values of the 2048-bit n and the  
32-bit e) that will be used by ROM to verify the signature 
during loading.
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 7. Sign the manifest using the RSA private key and place the 
signature in the manifest. The 2048-bit signature is generated 
on the entire manifest data exception for the RSA public key 
and the signature itself.
 8. Append all modules after the manifest at their proper 
locations specified in the module entries.
The firmware security version number in the manifest header is an important field 
for managing firmware update or downgrade for cases where vulnerability is found and 
patched. Figure 4-1 illustrates the structure of the manifest.
Figure 4-1. Manifest floor plan
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During boot, the embedded engine’s ROM initializes internal memory and copies 
the firmware image from the flash. The first thing it loads from the flash is the manifest.
Here is the boot loader flow in ROM:
 1. Read the RSA public key from the manifest.
 2. Calculate the SHA-256 hash on the RSA public key and compare 
the resulting digest with the hardcoded digest in ROM. If they do 
not match, then the image is corrupted and will not be loaded.
When ROM is created, the SHA-256 digest of the RSA public 
key is hardcoded in the code. The reason for hardcoding the 
256-bit hash of the RSA public key, and not the complete 
2080-bit RSA public key itself, is to save space in ROM.
 3. Verify the digital signature of the manifest using the public 
key. If the signature verification fails, then the image is 
corrupted and will not be loaded.
 4. Check validity of the manifest header, such as the firmware 
version.
 5. Load the first firmware module by copying its binary from the 
flash. The first module is usually named “Bringup” or “Kernel”. 
If the module is compressed, then perform decompression.
 6. Calculate the SHA-256 digest on the decompressed module 
and compare with the corresponding hash value in the 
manifest. Note that at this point, the hash value in the 
manifest has already been verified by the RSA signature at 
step 3. If the digests do not match, then the image is corrupted 
and will not be loaded. 
 7. Once the first module is loaded, ROM hands the control to 
the “load manager” component of the first module, which will 
continue to load other modules listed in the manifest. 
 8. To load a module, the load manager copies the module’s 
binary from the flash and performs decompression, if 
required. Then the load manager calculates the SHA-256 
digest of the module and compares it with the digest in the 
manifest. If they do not match, then there are two options:
Stop loading this module and continue to load the next •	
module, or
Unload all modules that have been loaded and halt the •	
engine’s processor
The option taken depends on whether the module is fault-tolerant 
or non-fault-tolerant. Failure to load a fault-tolerant module does 
not break the engine’s functionality or impact other modules of 
the engine. On the other hand, all non-fault-tolerant modules are 
required for the engine to function properly.
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Figure 4-2. ROM flow for loading firmware
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Note that for a compressed module, its hash in the manifest is calculated on its 
decompressed binary instead of the compressed binary. This means that the boot loader 
first decompresses the module, places the decompressed module in the engine’s internal 
memory, and then verifies its integrity.
Does something seem suspicious? Yes. Unverified compressed binary is being 
placed in memory, at least temporarily. The binary is then decompressed to the internal 
memory. If the compressed fault-tolerant module is altered by an attacker, then it could 
overflow the buffer allocated for the decompressed module and overwrite other regions 
of the internal memory, making a code-inject attack possible. So hashing a decompressed 
module is arguably a poor security design practice and prone to vulnerabilities. To 
address the issue, the implementation must make sure that the buffer allocated for 
decompressed data is not overrun by the decompression algorithm.
A better design from the security perspective would be to hash the compressed form 
of the module. However, there is a major drawback of this option: memory consumption. 
The entire compressed module must be copied into internal memory before the 
decompression begins, and memory must be reserved for both the compressed module 
and the decompressed module.
On the other hand, if the hash is for the decompressed module, then there is no need 
to copy the compressed module into memory. The boot loader simply reads from the 
flash the compressed module in fixed-size chunks, and then performs decompression for 
the chunks as they come in. The decompressed module in the internal memory is then 
verified against the hash value specified in the manifest.
When architecting a computer system, there are two conflicting factors to consider, 
one being performance and resource consumption, and the other being security. There 
is almost always a tradeoff between the two sides. For systems where resources are not a 
major concern, it is usually better to be safe than sorry and give more weight on security. 
For embedded systems, however, due to the limited computing resources available, the 
decision is sometimes more difficult to make. It requires designers to dive deep into the 
threat analysis and risk assessment.
Memory Integrity
For the security and management engine, the level-1 cache is inside the processor. The 
engine has dedicated internal memory that serves as the level-2 cache. The capacity of 
the level-2 cache varies, depending on the product, and ranges from 256KB to 1MB. In 
the security modeling, the level-1 and level-2 cache memory is considered immune from 
external attacks. No encryption or integrity protection is applied.
But the embedded engine requires more runtime memory to run its applications. A small 
region of the system’s DRAM is “borrowed” by the engine and used for the purpose of paging. 
The size of the borrowed memory ranges from 4MB to 32MB, depending on the product.
The embedded engine uses the borrowed DRAM for temporary volatile storage only. 
The engine’s processor cannot directly reference addresses in DRAM, execute code from 
DRAM, or modify data in DRAM. When a page in DRAM needs to be accessed by the 
processor, the engine’s paging unit has to first bring it into the internal memory.
During boot, the BIOS reserves a small portion of DRAM and notifies the security and 
management engine of its address and size. The BIOS hides this portion of DRAM from the 
operating system running on the host. From then on, the engine has exclusive control and 
access to this region. The host is not supposed to address, reference, or access the region.
Chapter 4 ■ the engine: Safeguarding itSelf before Safeguarding otherS
102
However, hackers have shown that breaking into the reserved DRAM region is not 
impossible. The attack presented by Alexander Tereshkin and Rafal Wojtczuk successfully 
injects code into the reserved region. The injected code is later paged in by the engine 
and executed. This attack was possible because on Bearlake MCH (Memory Controller 
Hub), the management engine lacks integrity protection for the reserved region of DRAM.
How is the problem tackled in later generations of the security and management 
engine? Checksum is introduced for paging:
 1. Before moving a page from the internal memory to the 
reserved DRAM region, calculate a checksum of the page and 
store the checksum in the internal memory.
 2. The content of the page is not supposed to change while it is 
out in the DRAM.
 3. After moving a page from the reserved DRAM region to the 
internal memory, calculate the checksum of the page again 
and compare with the stored value calculated before. If the 
two values do not match, then the page has been altered. 
Although this is possibly due to a memory corruption, for 
defensive security design, the security and management 
engine treats it as an attack and triggers an instant shutdown 
of the platform, which includes the engine itself and the host.
When looking for the right checksum algorithm, several conditions were considered:
The algorithm must be extremely simple and fast. Since paging •	
is a very frequent runtime operation, the speed of paging plays 
a significant role in the engine’s performance. Latency of paging 
must be minimized, as it negatively impacts the user’s experience.
The checksum must be small in size, because the internal •	
memory space is limited and expensive. The more internal space 
is assigned to checksum storage, the less space is available for 
running programs.
The algorithm must be able to detect alteration of pages in DRAM •	
with a high level of confidence. 
Digital signature is ruled out immediately, as it is too slow to meet the performance 
and storage requirements outlined.
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Next candidates are hash and HMAC. Velocity-wise, they are much faster to calculate 
than digital signature schemes. Also, the security and management has a hardware 
cryptography engine for expediting hash and HMAC. Security-wise, they are NIST-
approved algorithms that offer proven strength of integrity assurance. But they are still 
not optimal because of two reasons:
The size of the digest is too large to fit in the internal memory.  •	
If the reserved region is 16MB and page size is 4KB, then there  
are 4096 entries. Using SHA-1, the size of internal memory 
required for storing all digests is as much as 80KB. Additionally, as 
will be discussed later in this section, there is other metadata that 
must be stored in the internal memory for a page entry.
The speed of calculation is not fast enough to support runtime •	
applications that require high throughput, such as AMT.
Now the only candidate is the CRC algorithm. It is simple and fast to calculate. The 
checksum is only 32 bits long. All that makes it a good choice from the performance 
perspective. What about security?
CRC is an error-detecting code. It does not use a key and it is not cryptographically 
strong. Imagine a naïve attack scenario: the hacker reads a page from the reserved DRAM 
region and calculates its CRC checksum. He then modifies the page content such that the 
checksum remains unchanged. For a 4KB page and 32-bit checksum, finding different 
pages with the same checksum is rather trivial.
So, it seems none of the standard integrity protection algorithms has characteristics to 
satisfy all requirements of the security and management engine. To address the problem, 
Intel’s cryptographers have designed a proprietary algorithm specifically for paging 
integrity. The algorithm is based on binary polynomial operations. The input includes:
4KB or 1KB of raw page data•	
256-byte secret key•	
The output is a 32-bit integrity check value (ICV), which must be kept secret.
During the first time the security and management engine boots and before paging is 
enabled, the engine generates a 256-byte random number and writes it to the registers of 
the ICV generation hardware logic. The engine also stores the random number on flash as 
a secret blob. This number is used as the secret key input to the ICV algorithm.
During the following boots, the key is retrieved from the flash and reused. 
Although regenerating a new key randomly at every boot is apparently more secure, it 
is experimentally shown that generating 256 bytes of random data from the engine’s 
hardware RNG is slower than reading a blob from the flash. For most computing systems, 
the boot time is a critical performance benchmark.
However, there is one case that the ICV key will be regenerated. Before moving a 
page out of the internal memory, the paging engine in the kernel calculates the page’s ICV 
value and saves the resultant ICV in a preallocated region of the internal memory. The 
ICV calculation is performed by dedicated hardware logic. Later, when bringing a page 
into the internal memory, the same calculation is repeated and the result compared with 
the saved value.
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What if the comparison fails? When the security and management engine feels 
that “something is wrong,” several different actions can be considered as response. The 
firmware designers must decide what actions to take when something is wrong. The 
questions to ask are as follows:
Is the error more likely a result of a firmware or hardware bug, or •	
is the error more likely due to an active attack?
Is it possible to recover from the error without leakage of secrets •	
and assets?
Because of its criticality, all firmware and hardware components involved in the 
paging operation are reviewed and validated thoroughly. Furthermore, DRAM failure 
is very rare thanks to improved error-correcting and other technologies deployed in 
modern DRAM devices. Given these facts, when an ICV check failure occurs, the engine 
has very high confidence that it is due to an attack that is attempting to change the page 
being brought in from the DRAM. The most effective response to terminate the attack and 
prevent loss of assets is to shut down the platform immediately and ungracefully.
Before shutting down the platform, the engine deletes the blob that stores the ICV 
key from the flash. At the next boot, the engine will generate and use a new key.
Admittedly, the algorithm is not as strong as a standard hash, but it is good enough 
to protect the engine. With this proprietary algorithm, page alternation or replacement 
attacks become very difficult to mount.
As the ICV is a 32-bit secret, and the key is also secret, an attempt at random page 
alternation has a success probability of only 1 in 232. A random attempt will fail almost 
definitely, and as a result, the platform is rebooted and a new ICV key is utilized. This 
means that the attacker cannot learn from failures, and his prior failed attempts do not 
increase the chance of future success. All attempts have a success probability of 1 in 232, 
no matter if it is the first or the one thousandth attempt.
Another important design to make the attack even harder is that the engine keeps 
the ICV secretly. Furthermore, a platform reboot following a failed attempt takes at least 
a few seconds to complete, which substantially slows down automation. As the ICV of a 
page is unknown, hackers cannot simply perform the page alternation attempts “offline” 
without actually running the engine.
As a result, altering a page and not being detected by the embedded engine is 
practically impossible.
Checksums must be kept secret. A straightforward design is to keep the checksums 
for all pages in the internal memory. This method consumes valuable memory space. To 
save memory space, the security and management engine also swaps pages that store 
checksums to reserved DRAM region. The checksums for such pages are always stored in 
the internal memory.
When a page fault happens, the paging engine looks for the checksum of the page in 
the internal memory. If the checksum is not found, that means the checksum is out in the 
DRAM also. In this case, the paging engine brings the checksum page into memory first, 
and then brings the actual page of the page fault into memory.
For this design, handling a page fault may require two pages being swapped into 
memory, which seemingly will degrade performance. But the fact is, the opposite occurs. 
Experiments show that with comprehensive victim (a page that is selected to be swapped out 
to DRAM) selection heuristics, this design actually improves performance because there are 
fewer checksums occupying memory, and hence more memory is available as cache.
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Memory Encryption
Besides integrity, confidentiality is also a requirement for data pages while they reside in 
the reserved DRAM region. A page is encrypted before being moved out to the DRAM. 
The ICV is calculated on the encrypted page. Pages that contain only code segments 
require protection for integrity but not confidentiality.
The algorithm used for encrypting data pages is 128-bit AES with CBC mode. During boot, 
the AES key for encrypting pages is derived from security fuses. The key is unique per part, as 
the fuses are unique. The key is stored in the internal memory and never paged out to DRAM.
Since the IV (initialization vector) for CBC mode must be unpredictable, the IV for 
encrypting a page is randomly generated every time the page is about to be moved to 
DRAM. The IV is stored together with the ICV.
Task Isolation
An embedded system is a computer system designed to realize dedicated and specific 
functions with computing constraints. The system includes hardware and firmware that 
runs on the hardware.
Embedded systems usually suffer from resource constraints (limited computing 
horsepower, memory, storage space, and so forth). An embedded system with a single-
threaded or a multithreaded real-time operating system (RTOS) can run multiple 
processes. On the security and management engine, process is also referred to as task.
In an embedded system that runs multiple processes (tasks) without isolation, 
successful attack or compromise against one or more applications may result in the 
attacker gaining execution privilege and secrets of the peer applications. This is a critical 
security problem for embedded systems.
Process isolation as a security measure is widely supported by modern operating systems 
such as Windows, Linux, and Android. Is the same concept applicable to embedded systems? 
Intel’s security and management engine resolves the problem by applying innovative task 
isolation techniques. The task isolation is the most involved and comprehensive security 
measure on the engine. This section covers the details of the technique.
Deploying task isolation on the engine has been an evolving effort. There was no task 
isolation for the first generation of the engine, as the size of the firmware was relatively small at 
that time, and all kernel and applications were developed in-house by Intel. As the number of 
applications running on the engine increased, isolation became a must-have security measure.
As the first step, the engine’s firmware was split into two tasks—privileged and 
nonprivileged:
The privileged task, also known as the •	 kernel, consists of modules 
that manage critical system resources and handle secrets. They 
include the boot loader, kernel, hardware drivers, power flow 
management, EPID manager (see Chapter 5 for details), and so on.
The nonprivileged task consists of the remainder of the firmware •	
modules; for example, applications like AMT and anti-theft.
The logical separation between privileged and nonprivileged tasks is enforced by 
the privileged task and hardware. The hardware backbone of the engine supports two 
modes of operation: privileged mode and nonprivileged mode. Different access rights to 
hardware devices and other system resources are granted based on the mode in which 
the firmware is actively running.
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In newer versions of the security and management engine, the number of embedded 
applications keeps growing. The number exceeds ten on the engine shipped with big 
core processor in 2013 (codename Haswell). With this many applications, the size of 
the engine’s nonprivileged modules becomes considerably large. Consequently, risk of 
security bugs and vulnerabilities rises.
How to realize task isolation for multiple tasks in a hardware environment that 
supports only privileged and nonprivileged tasks? The trick is to treat and protect all 
nonprivileged tasks that are not actively running as privileged tasks, so that the running 
nonprivileged task cannot compromise them.
Asset Protection
The task isolation technique implemented by the engine makes sure that bugs in one task 
are restricted to its own task and do not affect any other tasks. In other words, even if the 
bug is exploited by attackers, other tasks are immune and safe.





Synchronization objects: thread, semaphore, mutex, queues, and •	
so forth
An asset belongs to one and only one task during its lifetime. The owner is normally 
the creator of the asset. The ownership cannot be transferred to another task.
The central governing component, kernel, manages all system resources. It is 
responsible for implementing and enforcing task isolation for nonprivileged modules. 
The kernel is a hybrid component of firmware and hardware. The interface of the kernel is 
minimized to reduce the attack surface.
The kernel provides critical and system level services to nonprivileged components. 
These services include: cryptography algorithms, memory management, nonvolatile 
storage, DMA, power management, and so on. For protected assets owned by individual 
tasks, the kernel exposes API for the tasks to call and manipulate.
For example, nonvolatile secrets stored on flash are assets of their owning tasks. The 
kernel has APIs for creating, writing, reading, and deleting the data. Another example: 
semaphore is an asset of its owning task. The kernel has APIs to create, get, put, and 
delete a semaphore.
Figure 4-3 demonstrates the kernel’s flow of handling a call from a nonprivileged task 
for asset manipulation. A few important facts to note:
The kernel is threadless and all kernel API functions run in the •	
caller’s thread.
A thread is always associated with one and only one task.•	
Metadata of threads and other assets for all tasks is stored in the •	
privileged memory and cannot be modified by nonprivileged 
tasks. The metadata of an asset includes the ID of the owning task 
of this asset.
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Kernel
Read owner task ID of the
requested asset
Read task ID of current
thread







Receive call for manipulating
asset
Figure 4-3. Asset (nonvolatile data, synchronization objects, and so on) manipulation 
control flow
As you can see in Figure 4-3, the kernel makes sure that the asset being accessed 
belongs to the same task as the caller’s thread—that is, an application is not allowed to 
access another task’s assets through kernel APIs. Such a request is considered an attack 
and will trigger exception. If a task has legitimate reasons to access assets of another task, 
then it must do so through the inter-task call mechanism.
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Memory Manager
The memory manager, a component in the kernel, is responsible for the following:
Managing the embedded system’s memory space•	
Creating a dedicated memory pool for each task (a task can only •	
access its own memory region)
For •	 malloc() calls, allocating memory only from the calling task’s 
memory region
The embedded engine’s memory is divided into multiple regions as overlays. The 
kernel has read/write access to all memory regions. There is no memory region that 
can be accessed by more than one nonprivileged task. The size of a memory region is 
determined by the actual usage model of the owning task. A task can be assigned multiple 
memory regions with different properties—for example, one region that can be accessed 
by both the processor of the engine and the DMA devices, and another region that is only 
accessible by DMA.
Figure 4-4 shows a conceptual example of three tasks in 1MB memory space and 
their overlays.
Kernel memory
(no access by non-
kernel tasks)
Task 1 memory region
(DMA and processor)
Task 2 memory region
(DMA and processor)
Task 3 memory region
(DMA and processor)
Task 1 memory region
(DMA only)
Task 3 memory region
(processor only)
Kernel memory
















Figure 4-4. Memory overlay
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Thread Manager
The single-threaded or multithreaded thread manager is also a component in the kernel. 
It manages threads and schedules threads to run.
One and only one thread is actively running at any moment. A thread is associated 
with one and only one task throughout the lifetime of the thread.
At runtime, the system determines whether requested assets/resources can be 
accessed based on the task of the currently running thread. At thread switch,iii  the RTOS 
examines the owner tasks of the current thread and the next thread, respectively. If the 
two threads are owned by different tasks, then the RTOS programs the MPR (memory 
protection range) control register accordingly to predefined values to reflect the 
restriction applied to the next thread. Figure 4-5 illustrates the flow.
iiiThe scheduler decides to preempt the currently running thread with another thread.
Kernel
Read task ID of next thread
Read task ID of current
thread
Scheduler runs next thread
(“next” becomes current)
Program MPR control






Figure 4-5. Thread switch flow
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Memory Protection Control
The security and management engine’s hardware backbone supports a set of MPRs. 
The number of MPRs implemented in a specific product depends on the number of 
nonprivileged tasks. Each MPR consists of a set of three registers:
Start address•	
End address•	
Access restriction (assumes one of the following values)•	
No read/write by processor or DMA•	
Read only by processor and DMA•	
No read/write by processor but can be read/write by DMA•	
Can be read/write by processor but no read/write by DMA•	
Other access restrictions as needed•	
The MPRs enforce the access restrictions applied to the currently running 
nonprivileged task for the entire memory space. When the kernel is running, MPRs are 
not enforced because the kernel can access the entire firmware memory space.
On the security and management engine, an MPR control register is introduced 
for rapidly enabling and disabling an arbitrary set of MPRs. For example, if there are 64 
MPRs, then a 64-bit MPR control register is used, one bit for each MPR. If a bit of the 
MPR control register is 0, then the corresponding MPR is disabled and not enforced for 
memory access; if a bit is 1, then the corresponding MPR is enabled and enforced for 
memory access.
During boot, the kernel programs MPR registers for all possible combinations that 
may be encountered at runtime. The MPR control register will be programmed by the 
RTOS at runtime upon task switch to realize fast switch between MPR policies of two 
tasks. This trick eliminates the need for programming the three registers of each MPR for 
all MPRs at runtime, resulting in significant performance improvements.
For the example, in Table 4-1, nine MPRs are used. The three registers of each MPR 
are programmed by RTOS, at boot, as follows:
•	 MPR#1: {0x00000000, 0x0000FFFF, no read/write by processor/
DMA}
•	 MPR#2: {0x00010000, 0x00021FFF, read only by processor/DMA}
•	 MPR#3: {0x00022000, 0x0002FFFF, no read/write by processor/
DMA}
•	 MPR#4: {0x00030000, 0x0009FFFF, no read/write by processor/
DMA}
•	 MPR#5: {0x000A0000, 0x000AFFFF, no read/write by processor/
DMA}
•	 MPR#6: {0x000B0000, 0x000C1FFF, no read/write by processor/
DMA}
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•	 MPR#7: {0x000B0000, 0x000C1FFF, no read/write by processor; 
RW by DMA}
•	 MPR#8: {0x000C2000, 0x000FFFFF, no read/write by processor/
DMA}
•	 MPR#9: {0x000C2000, 0x000FFFFF, read/write by processor; no 
read/write by DMA}
Table 4-1. Active Task and MPR Control Setting
Active task MPR control register




At runtime, the MPR register values do not change; the MPR control register 
is programmed to reflect memory enforcements. The actively running task and the 
corresponding MPR control register value (the leftmost bit represents MPR#1, and the 
rightmost bit represents MPR#9) are shown in Table 4-1.
When the privileged kernel is running, MPRs are not enforced.
When task 1 is running, MPR#1: {0x00000000, 0x0000FFFF, no read/write by 
processor/DMA} is enabled. According to Figure 4-4, memory range from 0x00000000 
to 0x0000FFFF belongs to the kernel. Task 1 shall not access this range. This is why the 
memory access restrictions defined by MPR#1 are enabled and enforced when task 1  
is active.
Similarly, MPR#5: {0x000A0000, 0x000AFFFF, no read/write by processor/DMA} 
is also enabled when task 1 is running. This is because the range of {0x000A0000, 
0x000AFFFF} belongs to task 3, and task 1 shall not access it. Likewise, when task 1 is 
running, MPR#2, MPR#4, MPR#7, and MPR#8 are enforced.
However, memory access restrictions defined by MPR#3: {0x00022000, 0x0002FFFF, 
no read/write by processor/DMA} are disabled, because this range is owned by task 1, the 
running task.
Loader
The loader is responsible for loading a task to the memory region allocated by the 
memory manger.
Figure 4-6 shows the boot flow. The loader in the kernel loads the tasks one after 
another to their memory regions and initializes the tasks. The main operation that a task 
performs at start is to create its worker threads by calling the kernel’s thread creation 
function. All threads created are tagged with the owning application’s task ID, and it does 
not change for the lifetime of the thread.
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Inter-Task Call Management
On the security and management engine, a task can provide services to one or more other 
tasks through an indirect calling mechanism implemented by the kernel. For example, if 
a task needs to access assets (such as nonvolatile data) of another task, it can do so via the 
inter-task call mechanism.
Due to memory protection and isolation, direct calling between two tasks is a 
violation of task isolation and explicitly prohibited. When a task (say, task 1) needs to 
consume services offered by another task (say, task 2), task 1 invokes kernel’s inter-
task call API and specifies the function of task 2 to be called. The kernel performs the 
following steps for an inter-task call.
Kernel
Program all MPR and APR
registers
ROM (read only memory)
Load kernel






System idle (waiting for
ready worker thread to run)










Figure 4-6. Boot flow
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 1. Copy input parameters from task 1’s memory to task 2’s 
memory.
 2. Call task 2 on behalf of task 1. The kernel will notify task 2 that 
the caller is task 1. Task 2 can decide whether to serve task 1 or 
reject the call.
 3. Copy the output from task 2’s memory back to task 1’s 
memory.
 4. Conclude the call.
The inter-task call is a costly operation because the kernel has to copy input and 
output data between the caller task and the callee task. The design guideline is to minimize 
the use of inter-task calls and avoid calling other tasks in performance-critical flows.
In Figure 4-7, the dotted line shows that task 1 is calling task 2 through the kernel. 
Note that all tasks directly consume the kernel and only the kernel. Tasks cannot 
consume each other directly.
Task 1 Task 2 Task 3
Kernel (RTOS, memory manager, inter-task call manager, DMA, etc.)
Figure 4-7. Inter-task call
Exception Handler
When the kernel firmware or hardware detects access violation, an attack is assumed to 
be actively undergoing. All threads belonging to the violating task shall be terminated 
immediately—that is, the task is stopped from running until the next power cycle.
Alternatively, a more aggressive reaction upon access violation is to reset the entire 
embedded system. This is the approach implemented by the security and management 
engine.
Nonprivileged Tasks
A nonprivileged task is an embedded application that realizes a specific set of 
functionalities—for example, playing back a movie.
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A nonprivileged task may consume services provided by the kernel and other 
nonprivileged tasks. A nonprivileged task may also invoke dedicated hardware 
components. Multiple tasks may exist on an embedded system.
A nonprivileged task is banned from directly accessing other tasks’ assets. Such 
access must be accomplished through the inter-task call mechanism. Access violation 
results in termination of the violating task or resetting the embedded system.
Firmware Update and Downgrade
The security and management engine supports firmware update and downgrade; that is, 
replacing the firmware that is currently installed on the platform with another version of 
the firmware. The firmware update replaces an older version of firmware with a newer 
version. It is used by Intel to deliver additional features or fix functional or security 
bugs to the end users. If a newer version of firmware fails to work on a platform, most 
commonly due to device compliance issues, then the firmware downgrade is used to 
rollback to an older version of firmware that works on the platform.
The firmware update is launched from a software program on the host. The new 
firmware can be downloaded from the manufacturer’s web site and installed by end 
users. The new firmware has the same integrity protection mechanism as the current 
firmware on the platform.
The firmware security number in the manifest header (see Figure 4-1) is used for 
preventing firmware update or downgrade from a “good” version to a version with known 
security vulnerabilities. For example, when security vulnerability is found in version A 
with security number 1, Intel will release version B that fixes the bug. As the new firmware 
fixes security bugs, the security number will be incremented and B will have a security 
number of 2.
When a firmware update from A to B is launched, A will check B’s security number 
as it loads the manifest of B. If B’s security number is the same or greater than A’s, then 
proceed with the update. If B’s security number is smaller than A’s, then it is considered a 
rollback attack (i.e., replacing a patched version with a vulnerable version). In this case, A 
immediately aborts the firmware update/downgrade flow.
Published Attacks
Ever since its birth in 2006, the management engine has been the target of many hackers 
and attackers in the computer security community. For white-hat hackers, trying to find 
and exploit bugs in the engine is an interesting academic research and challenge. For 
black-hat attackers, successful attacks could generate monetary profit.
To date, the most famous attack against the engine was the one mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter: “Introducing Ring -3 Rootkits,” published by Alexander 
Tereshkin and Rafal Wojtczuk of the Invisible Things Labs, at the Black Hat conference  
in 2009.
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“Introducing Ring -3 Rootkits”
There are several components of the attack.
 1. Perform literature research and find out the model of the 
processor used by the engine.
 2. Circumvent the flash lock and dump the engine’s firmware 
binary from the flash.
 3. Use IDA disassembler10 to disassemble and reverse-engineer 
the firmware code.
 4. Rollback the BIOS to a version with a known bug that does 
not lock down memory remapping registers. This vulnerable 
release of BIOS allows the attack to redirect the engine’s 
reserved DRAM region to an arbitrary location in DRAM. 
(The BIOS vulnerability was also found by Rafal Wojtczuk 
and Alexander Tereshkin and published at the Black Hat 
conference in 2009.)
 5. Exploit the BIOS bug and redirect the reserved region to a 
region that can be written by attack.
 6. Debug the engine’s firmware and hook an application that 
writes data to the host memory via DMA.
 7. Inject rootkit to the DRAM region. The rootkit writes to host 
memory through DMA.
It should be pointed out that the attack is only possible on Bearlake MCH, released 
in 2007. The management engine on Bearlake MCH lacks integrity protection on the 
reserved region of the DRAM. This is one of the vulnerabilities exploited by the attack. 
Intel implemented the ICV check mechanism for the reserved DRAM region in the 
management engine released in 2008.
The attack takes advantage of two vulnerabilities. The other one is a buffer overflow 
in an older version of BIOS. Although the BIOS was patched soon after the issue was 
reported, BIOS downgrade was not disallowed. The lesson shows how firmware rollback 
prevention and integrity protection are vital to computer security.
However, the attack has some limitations:
 1. It must hook an application that uses DMA. The researchers 
did not find a way to have the rootkit program DMA directly.
 2. There is no way to perform DMA without redirecting memory 
remapping for BIOS. The remapping clears upon reboot.
 3. Not all host memory is open to the embedded engine. For 
example, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the VT-d and 
SMM memory cannot be accessed through the embedded 
engine’s DMA.
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